Espionage in state offices / SHISH revealed the senior official! “Recruited a non-friendly country”

SHISH in this report shares with the public this espionage case identified by agents on the ground.

Excerpt from the SHISH report

The Republic of Albania, as a NATO member country and a candidate country for accession to the EU, has been and continues to be constantly in the main focus and attention of the intelligence agencies and security of non-governmental countries. The access and activity of these agencies, through their hybrid activity of intelligence and other influences, in the context of the alignment and membership of the countries of the region in the western alliances, are evident in all Western Balkan countries and aim to create delays and obstacles in integration. of these countries in the structures of the EU and NATO. These intelligence agencies, over the years, have continued the intelligence activities through their employees with diplomatic cover in the respective embassies in our country and the region.

SHISH, in reference to the threats posed by this presence, permanently carries out activities in the field of counterintelligence, in order to timely identify threats and carry out countermeasures, maintaining a fair ratio between the need to provide information and implementation legislation, the Prosecutor General’s procedures and respect for human rights. In order to create a more complete picture of the activity of the SIS counterintelligence structures in the way of dealing with these threats, we are giving an example related to the work that SISH does for the preservation of national security. “RESIDENT” An example from the field of counter-espionage busy in contacts with various citizens of our country, including employees of central and local administration, due to the diplomatic function he used as a cover. The advantage of this operative is the knowledge of the Albanian language and the dexterity in creating contacts.

His tendency to have access to and facilitate meetings in the offices of institutions that administer classified information has been noted, as well as actions to avoid oversight by security structures. The first suspicions that “Resident” had launched a possible recruitment operation came after attending several public telephone booths, at approximate hours on certain days of the month, which were realized after walking on city streets on foot and by car, for ensure that it is outside the scope of monitoring of specialized structures. The recipient of the phone calls was an Albanian citizen, an employee of the central institution A. The employee here is called “The Key”. In one case, on New Year’s Eve, the “Resident” communicates with the “Key” and asks for a meeting to wish him for the end-of-year holidays. Given this situation, several qualified actions were taken to document the meeting and assess the level of relations 15 THE STATE INFORMATION SERVICE between them. Assessing the “Resident” as a professional, who had little chance of making a mistake, operational tasks were planned to verify the figure and monitor the activity of the “Key”.

Also, measures were taken to verify the access of the “Key” to information classified as “State Secret” as well as data on changing his behavior in the daily work routine. The first data showed that “Resident” had rarely frequented the office premises where “Key” worked and, apparently, had not expressed any special interest in the direction of “Key”. SHISH learned that “Çelësi” had met “Resident” in one of the activities conducted by a diplomatic mission, where they exchanged telephone numbers after a chance meeting. Some time later, “Resident” had appeared in the office of “Key”, which at the moment happened to be alone, and had asked him about the location of the representative of foreign relations of the institution. Taking advantage of this situation, “Resident” invited him for coffee in one of the few bars in the vicinity of the institution. The “key” agrees to consume coffee, but in the conversations no concrete topic of interest was noticed. The conversations were of a general nature, about family, education, work environment and general issues. In the end, “Resident” invites him for a lunch out of town, setting the time and day, and asks for some information that, in the context of the task of “Key” did not constitute a secret matter. “Çelësi” agreed to meet for lunch, to get to know each other better and to use this “diplomatic” contact with the aim of studying with a scholarship offered by the state of “Resident” for his son.

During lunch, the “Resident” created a more complete knowledge of his personal and work profile, of the “Key” ‘s access to classified information, promising to help him educate his son. “Çelësi” complained that, with the income as a clerk, it was impossible for the boy to go abroad and expressed his gratitude for the help provided. The “resident” tells him that nothing was impossible if he offered help and gathered some information that would not interfere with his functional duty. After a brief hesitation, the “Key” agreed in principle to help him and the “Resident” asked for some information, providing him with an electronic device for throwing them. The “resident” also scheduled the next meeting for dinner, in another area and bar, outside the city.

In the next meetings, organized in a predetermined way or through calls from the booth of public telephones, “Resident” has given envelopes with different amounts of money to “Key”. Also, he has always paid the expense bills. The “Resident” has justified the secrecy of such meetings with the reasoning that he does it to protect the “Key” and therefore has given him another phone number, where he can communicate in urgent cases.

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