How can the war in Ukraine end?

What are the aims of the war and what should be pursued, there is no bargain for this in the West. Nor for the next question, by what means would this war end. The prevailing view in Germany is that the conflict can be resolved politically. That is why the option of negotiations is always mentioned as an alternative.

Indeed, Russia and consequently Ukraine have decided to end this war depending on the use of military weapons. The Russian intentions of the war leave no room here for political compromises.

And so a political solution to the conflict would be talked about only when the military dimension was established in the battle of war. If the fighting continues without territorial takeovers and governments have to pay a high political price for the war, then there may be a chance that the goals of the war will be declared achieved and at least a temporary ceasefire will be established. This would bring about a territorial status quo. Reaching a peace agreement seems unlikely, due to a number of unresolved issues such as Crimea or the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Republics, to which Russia has recognized independence.

It seems very unrealistic for Ukraine to regain all the lost territories since 2014, not even those lost from February 2022. But fortunately it is just as unrealistic for Russia to triumph over all of Ukraine. Without extensive mobilization, Russia does not have enough infantry forces to continue its offensive so intensified beyond the summer months. Russia’s smallest territorial objective is to occupy all the regions around Donetsk and Luhansk. Moscow is even forced to achieve this goal because it recognized their independence as a people’s republic. In other territories, parts of Kharkiv, Saporishya, etc., Russia can differentiate and be flexible.

Russia has almost occupied the entire Luhansk region and will continue fighting to take over Donetsk. But after that the Russian army is consumed. Any other strategic offensive such as against Odessa could be ruled out. So after the end of the battle in the Donbas, Moscow will also have an interest in trying some form of conflict resolution. But by then the Ukrainian army will have been hit hard, infrastructure will have been destroyed, society tired and the economy will be dependent on Western aid.

This could be a moment when a ceasefire could be reached, which would rely heavily on a territorial status quo. True Ukraine will not recognize the loss of territories, but a temporary freeze may be possible. Temporary in the sense that everything will depend on what the future developments in the Kremlin will be. A Russian leadership after Putin would be in front of the decision, if it is worth controlling parts of the Kherson region, the Kharkiv Saporish enough to endure years of sanctions.

To these potential developments is added the possibility of ongoing conflict at smaller levels. Ukraine could try to weaken the Russian occupiers through constant attacks and thus make possible the return of the occupied territories.

Major changes would be possible only if the Russian president were forced to hand over the post for a short period of time. A follower would have more room for maneuver, and possibly other interests as well.

Or indeed Russia does indeed declare a state of war and quickly mobilize many soldiers to send them to the front. Russia could thus gain much more Ukrainian territory than it currently does, but at a very high cost in human life. And this alternative would be very badly received in Russian society.

Christian Mölling is the Deputy Director of the German Foreign Policy Association, DGAP. The focus of his work is the common security and defense policy of the EU and NATO. András Rácz is an expert on Russia and security issues at the German Foreign Policy Association.

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