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The resignation of Mario Draghi as Prime Minister of Italy may seem like an event without much weight on the global stage. After all, he will most likely lead an interim government until September, when early parliamentary elections will be held.
Furthermore, leading figures of the Italian right – which is expected to triumph in the upcoming elections – have expressed support for Ukraine since the start of the Russian invasion on 24 February. But a more detailed analysis of the Italian political scene shows that Italy’s position towards the Ukraine War is likely to change significantly due to Draghi’s resignation.
And a change in Italy’s attitude to the war will undoubtedly be a serious blow to the West’s unified position in support of Ukraine. Mario Draghi, the former head of the European Central Bank, was sworn in as Italy’s prime minister in February 2021 to lead a government of national unity.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year later, Draghi took a firm stance in favor of Ukraine and against Russia. Italy helped strengthen NATO’s eastern flank, offered aid to Ukraine, and supported tough sanctions against Russia, although the country has historically had a strong trade relationship with Russia, and is heavily dependent on oil and gas. Russian.
The best indication of Italy’s importance in the Western response to the Russia-Ukraine war was Draghi’s visit to Kiev in June, along with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Draghi’s resignation is likely to fundamentally change Italy’s attitude towards the war and its attitude towards Russia.
Current polls show that the right is most likely to win the September elections. The leaders of the main right-wing parties have traditionally supported Vladimir Putin. Lege’s Matteo Salvini once appeared in public wearing a T-shirt with Putin’s face on it, and called him “one of the best leaders in the world.”
Georgia Meloni, head of Fratelli D’Italia, has praised Putin as a defender of “European values” and “Christian identity”. Then there is of course Silvio Berlusconi, long one of Putin’s best friends and supporters in Western European politics.
Even if a coalition of right-wing parties does not win an absolute majority in September, Italy’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war is still likely to change. Historically, the Italian public has had a pro-Russian streak, and is currently divided over who is to blame for the war that has broken out in Ukraine.
The Italian media have given a lot of space to characters who have a very friendly approach to the Kremlin, and who have defended Russia’s actions in Ukraine since the end of February. In particular, the Five Star Movement, a left-wing populist party, recently attacked the Draghi government’s decision to send military aid to Ukraine.
Of course, this does not mean that the next Italian government is likely to commit to full support for Putin’s Russia, given the brutality of the latter’s war in Ukraine. But this means that the Italian right will pursue policies that weaken Western unity against Russia.
First, the incoming Italian government is likely to pressure Ukraine to negotiate with Russia to end the war, even if it means Kiev has to cede territory to Moscow. In June, Salvini announced his plan for a “peace mission” to Moscow (which he abandoned after criticism from centre-left members of the Draghi government).
If Salvini is to be a leading figure in the next Italian government, he is likely to continue with his plan. Consequently, Italy will reinforce the “pacifist” side in the West, at the expense of the US-led position, according to which only Ukraine should decide what it is and is not ready to accept.
Second, a post-Draghi government is unlikely to support any additional sanctions against Russia, especially for oil and gas. Although neither party is currently in favor of leaving the European Union, Lega and Fratelli D’Italia are openly Eurosceptic, but also
the most critical recently of the inability of the Draghi government to bring energy prices under control.
Since the European Union requires a unanimous consensus before implementing sanctions, this means that Brussels will not be able to further increase sanctions against Russia in the energy sector.
Third, the West can expect a future Italian government to refuse to provide any new military aid to Ukraine. June polls showed that the Italian public registered the lowest level of support among the G7 countries for “military opposition to Russia”.
This position is fully consistent with Italy’s pacifist approach after World War II. Without openly supporting Russia, Italian officials will be able to argue that providing more military aid to Kiev is only helping to perpetuate unnecessary bloodshed.
Finally, a new post-Draghi government is likely to focus more on threats such as terrorism in the Mediterranean region, and much less on Russia, which NATO highlighted as a major rival even in the Strategic Concept of approved at the last summit in Madrid.
The focus on terrorism and other threats from the Mediterranean is much more in line with the Italian right’s fear of illegal immigration than concern about Russia. This kind of position of Italy would deepen the polarization between the countries of Eastern Europe, focused on opposing Russia, and the countries of Southern Europe, focused more on the threats coming from non-state actors.
The fall of Mario Draghi’s government, and the possible change of Italian policy towards the Russia-Ukraine War, suggests the emergence of a general challenge in the West’s approach against Russia. In much of the West, public outrage over Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has begun to fade.
Over time, the costs of the sanctions regime will weigh more heavily on the average citizen than the emotional response to a distant war. Governments can challenge the sentiments of public opinion for a time.
But the democratic political systems of the West put in power governments that represent the popular will. And in Italy, this is likely to lead to policies that put less pressure on Russia, and that weaken support for Ukraine.
Note: Jason Davidson, professor of political science at the University of Mary Washington./bota.al
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