The war in Ukraine changed Germany’s foreign policy

However, over the past week, the German government seems to have changed its mind about everything; it has joined the harsh sanctions imposed by other European countries, as well as decided to send weapons to Ukraine, calling on other countries to join such an initiative.

These are not isolated issues, as in a few days Germany seems to have changed or reviewed the key principles that have guided its foreign policy in the last thirty years. “Germany’s turn in foreign policy,” as the New York Times called it, has been reflected in several decisions taken by the German government since last Monday, when Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated the invasion of Ukraine.

First, Germany decided not to authorize the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, built in recent years to bring Russian gas to Germany and the rest of Europe. In recent years, the construction of the pipeline had been at the center of various disputes, but Germany had defended and strongly supported it. With the onset of the crisis on the Ukrainian border, the new German government had taken more cautious stances. But the firm decision not to authorize its use came only after Russia recognized the separatist territories of Donbass in eastern Ukraine. But then it was not long before Putin came to order the invasion of Ukraine.

Germany also joined the decision of other European countries to exclude some Russian banks from the SWIFT system. This exemption, which is considered one of the harshest sanctions imposed so far after the invasion, had been much talked about in the previous days, also because of Germany’s initial opposition to implementing it.

Subsequently, Germany took one of the most surprising and historic decisions, announcing the shipment of 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine, but also authorized the shipment of German weapons to Ukraine from other countries. Until a month ago, however, Germany had resolutely opposed sending weapons to or on the verge of conflict.

Also Sunday, the German government announced a major investment, worth about 100 billion euros in military equipment, increasing its defense spending by more than 2% of GDP. Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the increase in the defense budget during a special session in the German parliament, stating that “February 24, 2022, was a turning point in the history of the European continent.”

This statement, according to political scientist Daniela Schwarzer, of the Open Society Foundation, Germany was strategically repositioned, since by the end of World War II it had always held a strong anti-militarist position. For years, Germany was one of the few economic powers in the world without a strong army and has historically been reluctant to participate in military missions abroad. This traditional policy, which has lasted for a very long time, seems to have changed within a few days.

Finally, Germany has made it clear that it wants to be less dependent on Russian gas, which accounts for more than half of all the amount used in the country and is considered one of the main reasons for German reluctance towards Russia. Scholz stated this week that the country will take action to build two terminals for receiving and managing liquefied natural gas. Also, the German government has been more open to the use of nuclear energy, which Germany, after the Fukushima disaster, had decided not to use such technology.

In fact, the decisions taken by Germany in the last week have more to do with areas and issues for which care is not limited to economic crises, but is the result of a long-term political orientation, the so-called Ostpolitik. So the German foreign policy of the last thirty years is based on the opening of the German federal government to the countries of Eastern Europe. It was originally conceived by Willy Brandt, Chancellor of Germany from 1969 to 1974. As can be seen, this is a line of German foreign policy that seems to have been suspended now and, the turning point, was precisely the war in Ukraine.

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